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denial will raise the proper issue, or whether a new assignment4s is necessary.
A departure is just as objectionable46 un der the Code as at common law,
and pleaders must take the common law rules on that subject into account.
This is, in short, an outline at least of the general scheme of pleading
provided by the Civil Practice Act.
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NE OF the most difficult social problems created by the current
economic depression has been the providing of relief for the unemployed until future re-employment. Unemployment is, of course,
not a phenomenon peculiar to the depression; but during the depression the
vast American poor-house system and the generously endowed agencies of
private charity have proven insufficient to solve the problem, and the
municipalities, the states and the federal government have been compelled
to summon all available instrumentalities to meet an unparalleled crisis
directly. involving approximately i5,ooo,ooo unemployed persons. Contemporan~ously with the decisive shift in the agencies, method, and scope
of poor relief has come a similar shift in the laws applicable thereto, ranging in spirit from the Wisconsin Unemployment Reserve Act" to the
"dole" laws of most other states. It can definitely be stated that a new
body of statutory principles has been and is being enacted to provide a
concomitant growth in the law. It is proposed in this study to examine
the growth of this new body of law in Illinois, particularly in its apph.cation to the question of civil and criminal liability of relief recipients for
alleged "fraud" and "misrepresentation" in obtaining relief. This applica4s There is no provision in the Act, or in any of the other Codes, for a formal new assignment, but when the necessity arises a new assignment in fact is made by an amendment of the
complaint, Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205 (i88o).
41Trainor v. Wouman, 34 Minn. 237, 25 N.W. 4o (i885); Talbert v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., 314

Mo. 352, 284 S.W. 499 (1926).
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tion furnishes an excellent illustration of the new laws, for the limits fixed
to such liability indicate the intended scope of the new relief.
At the instance of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, numerous
informations have been filed in the courts charging relief recipients with
the obtaining of goods by false pretenses. Public defenders appointed by
the Chicago Bar Association have been designated to defend most of those
accused. Differences of opinion between counsel for the Commission and
counsel for the defense as to the elements of the new fraud have repeatedly
been aired in the public prints. Such differences of opinion on this question are vital and go to the very root of the theory underlying the new
statutes.
THE ILLINOIS PAUPER LAW

The legal provisions affecting the poor law system prior to- 1929 were in
the main based on certain sections of the Illinois Revised Statutes of 1845, 3
imposing upon counties and towns the duty to "relieve and support all
poor and indigent persons lawfully resident therein." 4 These provisions
and the accompanying laws affecting paupers and their settlements are
based substantially on early English statutes.- Most of the cases which
have arisen thereunder deal with the respective liabilities of public bodies
for the support of acknowledged paupers.6 In defining paupers, the statute
refers to poor persons "who shall be unable to earn a livelihood in consequence of any bodily infirmity, idiocy, lunacy, or other unavoidable
cause" and provides that certain relatives in a specified order shall be
liable for their support. 7 The Illinois Supreme Court has amplified this
definition by stating that
to become a public charge the person must be poor, and unable to earn a livelihood by
reason of some one of the enumerated causes, and must not have any of the enumerated
relatives of sufficient ability for their support.'
In 1925, the Illinois Assembly established 9 county bureaus of public
welfare in counties having a population over five hundred thousand, for
the purpose of consolidating "all branches of investigations, powers, functions and duties included in the term 'Social Service Functions.' ",s This
Substantially re-enacted in Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 107, §§ 14, i5.
4Ibid., §§ 14, 13.
- 27 Henry VIII, c. 25 (I535);I BI. Comm. ( 3 d ed. 1768), 359-365; 21 R.C.L., Poor and Poor
Laws (i918), 701-3, §§ 1-3.
6 Board of Supervisors v. Town of South Ottawa, 12 Ill. 480 (i85i); Board of Supervisors
v. Plaut, 42 Ill. 324 (1866); Board of Supervisors v. People, 49 Ill.
App. 369 (893).
7Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c.

507,

§ i.

8 City of Alton v. County of Madison, 21 Ill.
115, 116 (1859).

9 Ill.
Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 23, §§ 446-454.

- Ibid., § 448.
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term was defined" to include not only duties with reference to dependent
children, blind adults, etc., but also to "cases involving social, economic,
and home conditions, non-support, desertion and abandonment, where the
aid of the county or the jurisdiction of a court of record is invoked, '' 2 and
to "the furnishing of social servide and making provision of aid, food,
clothing, medical attention or other relief to all persons in said county
applying for or in need thereof.' 3 Thus it was already recognized that
the scope of state social service relief duties extends beyond the furnishing of bare subsistence to technical paupers. Save for this statutory exception, it can readily be seen that the pauper acts have in the main a restricted application, and are concerned, as were the old English poor laws,
only that the poor be sustained "so that none should die by default of
4
sustenance."'
EMERGENCY RELIEF ACTS

By act approved February 6, 1932,S the Illinois Assembly created the
Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, consisting of seven commissioners,
whose duty is "to provide relief to residents of the State of Illinois, who, by
reason of unemployment or otherwise, are destitute and in necessitous
circumstances."' 6 The Commission is also authorized to "make use of and
cooperate with counties, townships and any other municipal corporations
charged by law with the duty of poor relief and with other local relief
agencies."' 7 The statute specifically avoids the use of the term "poor and
8
indigent persons" which appears in the pauper acts.
A study of the emergency clauses in this statute and other statutes indicates a substantial change of attitude on the part of the Illinois Assembly
from the narrow terms of the pauper acts. Reference is made to "the degree of unemployment and the necessity for furnishing assistance to the
destitute without delay and particularly during the winter months.' 9 In
an act to provide unemployment relief funds by a state tax, the Assembly
declared an emergency "inas much as it is vitally necessary to provide
funds without delay for the relief of the hundreds of thousands of persons
2
who are in destitute circumstances."
Under the terms of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933," sub" Ibid., § 447.
3Ibid., §447(l1) •
12Ibid., § 447(10).
14 Mirror of Justices, c. i, §3.
0

isIll. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), C. 23, H§463-467.
6

' Ibid.,
-7Ibid.,

§ 464§ 464.

x8Ibid., c. 107,
'9 1bid., C. 23,

§H

14, 15.

§ 467.

2 Ill. Cahil's Rev. Stat. ('933), C. 23, § 470; see also H8 458, 462.
21H. R. Rep. No. 46o6, 73d Cong. (i933); 48 Stat. 55, 15 U.S.C.A. Supp.
(1933).

§

721-728
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stantial grants have been made to the State of Illinois "to aid in meeting
the costs of furnishing relief and work relief and in relieving the hardship
and suffering caused by unemployment '2' 2 and "to provide the necessities
of life to persons in need as a result of the present emergency." 23 In passing this act, Congress declared that "the present economic depression has
created a serious emergency, due to widespread unemployment and increasing inadequacy of State and local relief funds, resulting in the existing
or threatened deprivation of a considerable number of families and in''24
dividuals of the necessities of life.
The new statutes were considered by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a
suit2s involving the validity of a levy for the maintenance of a county
home. After citing the many statutes authorizing the county to erect and
6
maintain a poor house, the court stated:2
The different statutes above mentioned are distinctly and essentially humanitarian in
their purpose and must therefore receive a liberal construction where no constitutional
privilege is violated. The court takes judicial notice of the emergency relief measures
taken by the State and nation to relieve unemployment and distress during 1931 and

1932.
The Illinois Assembly, which created the Illinois Emergency Relief
Commission and provided most of the relief in Illinois, Congress, which has
provided for a substantial part of the relief, and the Supreme Court of
Illinois have all attested that there is a new object in the passage of recent
relief legislation.
FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION IN OBTAINING RELIEF

At this time, there are many informations on file in the courts charging
relief recipients with obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Illinois
Emergency Relief Commission now holds choses in action having a face
value in excess of $55,000 which have been tendered to the Commission by
former relief recipients in the hope of escaping criminal prosecution. It is
therefore pertinent to inquire what acts are necessary to constitute the
crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Illinois statute defining
the crime27 fixes certain necessary elements: (i) there must exist an intent
to defraud; (2) the defendant must make use of a false token, writing or
pretense; (3)the false pretense must be used to perpetrate the fraud; (4)
-Ibid., § 4a; I5 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 724a (1933).
23Ibid.

241bid., § 1; 15 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 721 (1933).
528, 186 N.E. 137 (1933).
25 People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin, 352 Il.
26352

IMl. 528, 531, x86 N.E. 137, 138 (i933).
Rev. Stat. (i933), c. 38, § 228.

27Ill.
Cahill's
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the fraud must be accomplished by means of the false pretense. If any of
these elements is absent, there can be no crime under the statute.
It has been contended, principally on the basis of an early New York
case,2S that the fraudulent obtaining of money or goods from a charity is
not indictable under the statute, on the ground that "the virtue [of charity] is sufficiently could [sic], inquisitive and scrupulous to be safe without
the protection of the criminal law. '' 29 Were this case still law, the contention would be correct; however, the case was repudiated by a subsequent
decision in the same jurisdiction3 ° and it has been distinguished or rejected
whenever the question has arisen. 3'
It also seems cldear that a charge of obtaining money or other property
attempt thus to obtain
by false pretenses may be predicated upon an
32
money or goods from a governmental agency.
Since it has been made the express statutory duty of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission to provide relief to residents of Illinois who are
"destitute and in necessitous circumstances, ' 1 33 it would surely seem that
no criminal or civil liability could be imposed upon a person who receives
relief and is "destitute and in necessitous circumstances" even though
prior to receiving relief, the recipient may have made one or more misrepresentations; for if the Commission grants relief according to the legislative mandate, it will always be presumed to be fulfilling its duty. It is
only when a recipient receives more relief than the statute permits or
authorizes the Commission to provide that he may be guilty of obtaining
goods by false pretenses. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine
the meaning of the words "destitute and in necessitous circumstances" as
used in the statute.
28People v. Clough, 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 35, (837).
30 McCord v. People, 46 N.Y. 470 (1871).
29 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 351, 352 (1837).
3' Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208 (1882); State v. Styner, 154 Ind. 3i, 56 N.E. 98 (igoo);
State v. Carter, 112 Iowa i5, 83 N.W. 715, 900 (I9oo); Commonwealth v. Whitcomb, 107
Mass. 486, 487 (1871) ("the law favors charity as well as trade, and should protect the one as
well as the other from imposture by means of false pretenses"); State v. Matthews, 91 N.C. 635
(1884); Baker v. State, 120 Wis. 135, 97 N.W. 566 (903); Reg. v. Jones, i T. & M. 270 (Cr.
App. i85o), in which the conviction was upheld despite the existence of another statute, 5 Geo.
IV, c. 83, § 4 (1824) against "endeavouring to procure charitable contributions of any nature
or kind under any false or fraudulent pretenses." This would indicate that, as today, the state
favored prosecution under the statute against false pretenses rather than under statutes specifically referring to frauds in charities; Reg. v. Hensler, ii Cox C.C. 570 (Cr. App. 1870).
32State v. Wilkerson, 98 N.C. 696, 3 S.E. 683 (887) (the defendant continued to draw a
pauper's stipend from the Board of County Commissioners after the removal of the pauper
from the county); State v. Kelly, 27 N.M. 412, 202 Pac. 524 (I92I); State v. Talley, 77 S.C. 99,
57 S.E. 618 (1907); 21 A.L.R. iSo.
33Ill..Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 23, § 464.
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In 1920, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor carefully computed a minimum quantity budget necessary
to maintain a family of five in health and decency, 34 intending to establish
a standard below which a family cannot go without danger of physical and
moral deterioration. The budget fails to include many ordinary comforts
such as stationery, postage, telephoning and telegraphing, and tobacco.

In June,

1929,

the cost of living index based upon this budget was

170.2

(1913 = xoo)35 and the estimated minimum for maintaining this cash budg-

et in Chicago was $2,431.96.36 In June, 1933, the cost of living index was
i28.3, 37 indicating a drop in the retail prices involved since June, 1929, of
approximately 24.6%.
A far more rigid budget providing only for the bare necessities of life,
omitting all savings against old age, sickness, future contingencies of any
sort, tuition, etc., has been established by the National Industrial Conference Board. A study of this budget in June, 193 1, revealed that the cost of
all items provided for was $i,8o8.64, as against $2,152. 14, the figure for the
budget established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 38 The cost of living
index in June, 1931, was 150.3 against 128.3 for June, 1933, 39 indicating a
fall in the retail prices involved of approximately 14.6%. A composite of
these two budgets gives an approximate average of the budget required
throughout Illinois. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that "no
yearly earnings which fall below the cost of the budget .... can be considered a living wage, since the total represents the lowest cost of the
meager budget allowed by the government as the bottom level of health
and decency. ' ' 4° A fortiori this is true of the budget conceived by the National Industrial Conference Board. It would seem, therefore, that so long
as the total available resources of a person are insufficient to maintain a
reasonable budget standard such as those of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
or of the Industrial Conference Board, i.e., so long as his health and decency are seriously impaired, he is "destitute and in necessitous circumstances" within the meaning of the statute imposing a duty on the Illinois
Emergency Relief Commission to provide relief.
The phrases "destitute" and "necessitous circumstances" have received judicial interpretation in many jurisdictions. In connection with a
34 Standards of Living (Bureau of Applied Economics, Bulletin No. 7, Rev. Ed.
3S12 Monthly Labor Review 65, 313 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, X921).

192o), i.

-6Facts for Workers (Labor Bureau, Inc., Sept. 1929).
3737 Monthly Labor Review 455 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1933).
31The Cost of Living in Twelve Industrial Cities, c. 12 (National Industrial Conference
Board, 1928).
39See supranote 37.

40 Laidler, How America Lives (3d ed. 1930), x7.
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statute providing punishment for non-support, the Kansas court stated
that the phrases imply a lack of the necessaries of life, covering not only
primitive physical needs and things indispensable to human existence and
decency, but also those things which are in fact necessary to the particular
person left without support. 4' Under a pauper statute, the Maine court
held that the term "destitute" does not exclude the ownership of property
not available for immediate relief, 42 and in a case involving the constitution and by-laws of a mutual benefit association, the Indiana court held a
43
man "destitute" although he received a pension of $29.65 a month.
There are other decisions 44 which confine the word "destitute" to a description of a state of great need and poverty. These cases involve criminal statutes which require a restricted interpretation and such situations
differ substantially from the granting of unemployment relief not only to
the small number of paupers and habitually unemployed of yesteryear but
also to manual and professional working people who are accustomed to
life according to the American standard of living. Furthermore, the declarations as of the Illinois Assembly and a recent dictum 46 of the Illinois
Supreme Court indicate a readiness to accept a new concept of the spirit of
unemployment relief. For these reasons it would seem that a broad construction should be given to the relief legislation, and criminal liability for
fraud in obtaining relief should be imposed only on persons who have obtained relief when the amount of their available resources plus the sum obtained from the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission would enable them
to live above the minimum standard of health and decency.
The requirement of a false token, writing, or pretense can generally be
fulfilled by the oral statement or written affidavit made by the relief recipient. Criminal liability might also be predicated upon the falsity of an
affidavit. If the requirements of the perjury statute 47 are met, an indictment for perjury would lie; but the practical difficulties of obtaining a conviction on such a charge are well known to lawyers experienced in criminal
cases. To meet this situation and provide an additional basis for criminal
liability, the Illinois legislature in 1933 passed a statute 4 providing that:
41State v. Waller, go Kans. 829, 136 Pac. 215 (1913).
42Inhabitants of Norridgewock v. Inhabitants of Solon, 49 Me. 385 (1862).
43 Supreme Council v. Grove, 176 Ind. 356, 96 N.E. I59 (igii).
44 St. John v. State, 22 Ala. App. 115, 113 So. 321 (1927); State v. Weyant,

149 Iowa 457,
128 N.W. 839 (igio); State v. Sayre, 2o6 Iowa 1334, 222 N.W. 20 (1928); Moorman v. State,
x29

Miss. 864, 93 So. 368

(X922).

4s See supra notes i9, 20.
46People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin, 352 Ill. 528, i86 N.E. 137 (i933).
47Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), c. 38,

§§ 482-485.

48Ibid., c. 107, § 15(2).
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Any poor and indigent person who applies for relief alid support shall furnish to the
over-seer of the poor or the county bureau of public welfare, as the case may be, a
sworn statement of his condition and submit to a reasonable examination by the overseer of the poor or the county bureau of public welfare as to his inability to support
himself or his dependents.
The statute then enumerates the items of information which the affidavit
must contain, and provides that: 49 "Any such person who wilfully makes
a false statement, in the sworn statement herein required, shall be denied
any relief or help and shall be guilty of perjury and punished accordingly."
Apparently no prosecutions have been initiated under this section, and the
difficulties which the statute suggests furnish ample reason for such failure:
(i) The statute applies only to relief granted by the overseers of the poor
or the county bureau of public welfare. It would probably not apply to
these agencies when they act as mere conduits for the Illinois Emergency
Relief Commission. The act creating the commission authorizes it to
"make use of and cooperate with"' 5° government agencies, but not to delegate its power. (2) The practical difficulties of obtaining a conviction for
perjury are great. (3) The statute applies only to "poor and indigent"
persons and the state would have the burden of proving the existence of
that status. The statute seems to be related more to conventional pauper
relief than to unemployment relief. (4)The statute would not apply to
false statements not enumerated in the statute.
At the same time a further attempt was made to create criminal liability
by enacting another statute providing that 5 '
any person who makes application for relief and support when such relief or support
is not required to maintain such applicant and his family or dependents, or makes
application for a greater amount of relief or supplies than is required for such purpose,
or who does not use such supplies for the purpose, for which they were furnished, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
The validity of this statute may be assailed on a number of grounds: (i)
The term "relief and support" is vague and ambiguous, and can be given
a large number of different constructions. (2) The word "maintain" seems
fatally ambiguous. It has received varying interpretations, 2 and it is entirely possible that the statute might receive a different construction in
each case which arises, depending perhaps on the manner of life to which
49Ibid., § 15(2 ) .
10 Ibid., c. 23, § 464.
s Ibid., c. 107, .§ X5(5).
s,Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 184 Ark. 415, 42 S.W. (2d) 564 (1931); Cromwell v. Converse, zo8 Conn. 412, 143 At. 46 (1928); In re Gabler's Will, 140 Misc. 581, 255 N.Y.S. 211
(193).
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the relief applicant was previously accustomed. (3) The statute fails to
specify to whom application must be made. (4) The statute fails to state
who is to determine the "purpose for which" the relief supplies are furnished.
Still another attempt to create an enforceable criminal liability is con3
tained in the same statute, which provides that5
Any over-seer of the poor or any officer or employe of any county bureau of public
welfare or any applicant for relief who connives with any other person or with each
other in obtaining relief or supplies or in obtaining a greater amount of relief or supplies than is required to maintain such applicant and his family, or dependents, or
who otherwise makes any unlawful disposition of any supplies furnished for relief
purposes is guilty of a misdemeanor.

The constitutionality of this section also seems somewhat dubious, and
several difficulties of proof are apparent: (i) The term "connives" is unduly vague; it would seem to comprise legitimate co-operation between an
applicant and a social service worker in obtaining necessary relief. (2)
The statute fails to state the persons or agencies from whom the relief or
supplies must be obtained. (3) The term "maintain" is objectionable, as
has been pointed out. (4) The "unlawful disposition" of supplies by definition could only be covered by pertinent sections of the Criminal Code
dealing with such unlawful acts as might be involved in the "disposition."
The writer is informed that proceedings have also been instituted charging relief recipients with conspiracy to defraud. The same problem of the
elements of fraud would be involved as in the cases of obtaining goods under false pretenses.
Thus, in the absence of a clear and provable case of perjury, it would
seem that the only practical method of prosecution for fraud in obtaining
unemployment relief would be under the statute against false pretenses.
This is in fact the attitude now taken by the attorney for the Illinois
Emergency Relief Commission.
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OBTAINIG RELIEF BY FRAUD

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that public bodies may recover for
support against persons (or their estates) who were not actually paupers
4
within the statutes at the time they were receiving relief and support.5
Such recovery will be allowed regardless of the good or bad faith of the
S3

l. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 107, § 15(2).
v. County of Kankakee, i96 Ill. 537, 63 N.E. ion

S4Dandurand

v. Cooney, 215 Ill. App. 617 (1919).

(1902);

Tazewell County
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supposed pauper and regardless of the intention of the public body to
effect a gift. The theory of the Supreme Court is that:SS
Intention does not enter into the case where the support is by a public body. If he
[the supposed pauper] was liable for his own support under the law, there was no officer
who could form an intention that gratuitous service should be rendered, which would
bind the county and release the defendant from liability.
Although this doctrine seems to be opposed to the weight of American
authority in the absence of a specific statute, s6 nevertheless, .in view of
the attitude of the Illinois courts, therefore, it would seem that relief recipients would be civilly liable, regardless of fraud or good faith, for any
relief obtained from the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission which,
added to the recipient's available resources, would exceed the amount
required to maintain a minimum standard of health and decency and to
prevent the recipient's falling into "necessitous circumstances."
CONCLUSION

In general form, the recent relief legislation follows the secular mould of
English and American poor laws, which grant aid, upon a bare subsistence
basis, only to wholly impoverished persons. The specific language of the
new statutes, however, clearly recognizes a new standard of poor relief designed to protect the deserving unemployed; everyone trapped in an economic crisis may look to the state, not only for bare protection from starvation but for the wherewithal to maintain substantially the present
American standard of living. Due to the broad scope of the Illinois statutes, it would seem that only in a limited number of cases could a criminal
conviction or a civil judgment for fraud in obtaining such relief be sustained.
ss Dandurand v. County of Kankakee, i96 Ill. 537, 541, 63 N.E. ioxi (X9o2).
s6 Stow v. Sawyer, 3 Allen (Mass.) 515, 517 (1862) ("How this might be if fraud were practiced on the town, we express no opinion"); City of Albany v. McNamara, 117 N.Y. 168,
22 N.E. 931 (1889); 55 L.R.A. 570.

